So, the question only really arises for type-identity; where, for instance, "seeing green" is always identical with a particular type of neurological state. But then the question is, how do you distinguish these different types of neurological experience? Maybe animals have similar enough neurology to humans that we could say their neurological states are of the same "type. We could also imagine intelligent aliens, who would presumably have a very different neurology to humans; but, maybe there are analogies between human biology and alien biology if, for instance, the aliens need oxygen, and they have some organ that pumps an oxygenated fluid around their body, we could call that organ a "heart," even if it's not all that similar to a human heart.
References and Further Reading 1. With respect to those mental concepts "clustering around the notions of consciousness, experience, sensation, and mental imagery," however, he held that no behavioristic account even in terms of unfulfilled dispositions to behave would suffice.
Seeking an alternative to the classic dualist positionaccording to which mental states possess an ontology distinct from the physiological states with which they are thought to be correlated, Place claimed that sensations and the like might very well be processes in the brain—despite the fact that statements about the former cannot be logically analyzed into statements about the latter.
Drawing an analogy with such scientifically verifiable and obviously contingent statements as "Lightning is a motion of electric charges," Place cited potential explanatory power as the reason for hypothesizing consciousness-brain state relations in terms of identity rather than mere correlation.
This still left the problem of explaining introspective reports in terms of brain processes, since these reports for example, of a green after-image typically make reference to entities which do not fit with the physicalist picture there is nothing green in the brain, for example.
At least in the beginning, J. Place in applying the Identity Theory only to those mental concepts considered resistant to behaviorist treatment, notably sensations. Because of the proposed identification of sensations with states of the central nervous system, this limited version of Mind-Brain Type Identity also became known as Central-State Materialism.
Where Smart diverged from Place was in the explanation he gave for adopting the thesis that sensations are processes in the brain.
According to Smart"there is no conceivable experiment which could decide between materialism and epiphenomenalism " where the latter is understood as a species of dualism ; the statement "sensations are brain processes," therefore, is not a straight-out scientific hypothesis, but should be adopted on other grounds.
On the epiphenomenalist picture, in addition to the normal physical laws of cause and effect there are psychophysical laws positing mental effects which do not by themselves function as causes for any observable behavior.
Adopting straight away the scientific view that humans are nothing more than physico-chemical mechanisms, he declared that the task for philosophy is to work out an account of the mind which is compatible with this view. Already the seeds were sown for an Identity Theory which covers all of our mental concepts, not merely those which fit but awkwardly on the Behaviorist picture.
Armstrong actually gave credit to the Behaviorists for logically connecting internal mental states with external behavior; where they went wrong, he argued, was in identifying the two realms.
His own suggestion was that it makes a lot more sense to define the mental not as behavior, but rather as the inner causes of behavior. Thus, "we reach the conception of a mental state as a state of the person apt for producing certain ranges of behavior. Besides the so-called "translation" versions of Mind-Brain Type Identity advanced by Place, Smart, and Armstrong, according to which our mental concepts are first supposed to be translated into topic-neutral language, and the related version put forward by Feigl, there are also "disappearance" or "replacement" versions.
As initially outlined by Paul Feyerabendthis kind of Identity Theory actually favors doing away with our present mental concepts. The primary motivation for such a radical proposal is as follows: Different philosophers took this proposal to imply different things.
This begs the question, of course, what such a new-and-improved vocabulary would look like. Responding to Feyerabend, a number of philosophers expressed concern about the appropriateness of classifying disappearance versions as theories of Mind-Brain Type Identity.
Perhaps the weakest were those of the epistemological variety. It has been claimed, for example, that because people have had and still do have knowledge of specific mental states while remaining ignorant as to the physical states with which they are correlated, the former could not possibly be identical with the latter.
The obvious response to this type of objection is to call attention to the contingent nature of the proposed identities—of course we have different conceptions of mental states and their correlated brain states, or no conception of the latter at all, but that is just because as Feigl made perfectly clear the language we use to describe them have different meanings.
The contingency of mind-brain identity relations also serves to answer the objection that since presently accepted correlations may very well be empirically invalidated in the future, mental states and brain states should not be viewed as identical.
A more serious objection to Mind-Brain Type Identity, one that to this day has not been satisfactorily resolved, concerns various non-intensional properties of mental states on the one handand physical states on the other.
After-images, for example, may be green or purple in color, but nobody could reasonably claim that states of the brain are green or purple. And conversely, while brain states may be spatially located with a fair degree of accuracy, it has traditionally been assumed that mental states are non-spatial.Mar 06, · Again, the mind-brain identity theory might be able to apply to non-humans.
The final example that comes to mind is intelligent computers.
They don't have neurology at all, so if we wanted to find a "type" of state that was identical to an experience, Status: Resolved. Identity Theory.
Identity theory is a family of views on the relationship between mind and body. Type Identity theories hold that at least some types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, literally identical with some types (or kinds, or classes) of brain states.
The materialist version of the mind/brain identity theory has met with considerable challenges from philosophers of mind. The author first dispenses with a popular objection to the theory based on the law of indiscernibility of identicals. The Mind as the Software of the Brain.
Ned Block New York University. 1. Machine Intelligence. 2. Intelligence and Intentionality. 3. Functionalism and the Language of Thought. 4. Searle's Chinese Room Argument. The Orch OR theory proposes quantum computations in brain microtubules account for consciousness.
• Microtubule ‘quantum channels’ in which anesthetics erase consciousness are identified. Mind-brain identity theory is something more than just the mind is the brain; So, each and every state of mind, is to be identified with, or is the very same thing as a state of the CNS.
Mind brain theory says-there's something more than just that the mind is the brain, So each and every.